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When a company talks about using information technology to "reengineer", it often 
means that a significant number of employees will be terminated as work flows are 
redesigned to achieve higher levels of efficiency mammer and Champy, 1993; Cafasso, 
1993 1. When the FBI urges Congress to require telephone companies to install special 
devices to track on-line phone setups (the transaction information describing who is 
calling whom), many believe that the FBI is creating the ability (as well as the perception) 
to conduct very large scale phone monitoring for unspecified purposes, thereby chilling 
political discussion and association [Markoff, 19931. When millions of individuals copy 
software, they create a $2.4 billion shortfall in revenues to the software industry, which 
may threaten the development of new software, force consolidations in the industry as 
profit margins fall, and encourage the growth of software oligopolies [Software Publishing 
Association, 19931. When companies announce that they will search each person's 
computer on company LANS looking for unauthorized (and potentially illegal) copies of 
sofEware, and perhaps monitoring e-mail files in the process, they are treading on the 
expectations of privacy and integrity which many consider necessary to their personal 
dignity [Stahl, 19941. 
These situations are illustrative of the individual, organizational, political, and 
social ethical issues which are now commonplace in the information systems arena. While 
these issues appear to be raised by and involve information technology, they really concern 
the uses to which information technology is put by key actors--individuals, organizations, 
polities and societies. 
Yet despite the explosion in information technology in the last 20 years, scholars, 
students, and practitioners would be hard pressed to find answers or even methodologies 
for arriving at answers in the IT ethics literature. There is an ethical vacuum in cyberspace 
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[Couger, 19891. There have of course been pioneers who have explored the outer fringes 
of the territory called IT ethics [Johnson, 1994; Dejoie, Fowler and Paradice, 1991; 
Fornester and Morrison, 1990; Khalil, 1993; LaChat, 1986; Lewis, 1993; Mason, 1986; 
Oz, 1992;1993; Parker, 1990; 19831 , but no systematic literature has emerged as one 
finds, for instance, in business ethics [Donaldson and Werhance, 19931 , medical ethics 
Fletcher, 19901 , or legal ethics [White, 19901. 
There are four difficulties with the existing IT literature which we explore and seek 
to address in this essay. First, with some exceptions, the nascent and early IT ethics 
literature is not well grounded in the classical or contemporary theories and language of 
ethics [the exceptions here is Johnson, 1994; and Cohen and Cornwell, 19911. Some 
findamental concepts of ethical behavior and description are therefore missing. Second, 
the early literature is often a response to pressing social problems and there is a resulting 
social crisis mentality calling for immediate, often legal, action. The attention paid to 
individual software theft through copying, system failures, "hacking," security lapses and 
the like give the IT ethics literature a disorganized topology [Ottensmeyer and Heroux, 
19911. Often, the literature reflects a particular bias towards the problems of powerfbl 
groups such as the concern for IT worker moral choice as opposed to concern about 
management and organizational ethical choices [Kling, 199 1 ; Kling, 198011. As a result, 
we have no map of the IT ethics domain which identifies major land masses, compass 
directions, levels of analysis, or recommended pathways to get from point A to point B. 
We need such a map to guide practitioners, to guide future research, and to illustrate for 
our students the issues they will surely face in the near future. 
Third, the literature has a highly atomistic, and individual orientation which focuses 
on what individual IT employees, managers, system designers should do. There is little in 
the literature about the qualities of a "good" or "ethical" IS group, organization, or the 
political uses of IT or consideration of an ethical IT-intensive society. Last, the existing 
literature is neither normative or prescriptive. There are few answers offered to the 
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questions, "What should I do, what should we as an organization do, what laws should we 
have, what social norms should we encourage?" Instead the literature often merely 
catalogs situations and offers up situational ethics without any general principles to guide 
us, and without suggesting a methodology. Often practitioners are advised to consult 
some professional code, of which there are at least four, and which often give contrary 
advice [Oz, 1992; 1993; Parker 19881. 
We cannot of course in this single essay thoroughly address all these issues. But 
we can make a start by identifLing key concepts in the classical and, more important, the 
contemporary ethics literature; develop a map of the ethical landscape based on key ethical 
dimensions; apply some of those contemporary concepts to the IT domain; and attempt to 
develop a prescriptive methodology for arriving at ethical rules (and hopefblly 
consequences). 
I. Basic Ethical Concepts Which Define A Moral Space 
Ethics is about the decisionmaking and actions of fiee human beings. When faced 
with alternative courses of action or alternative goals to pursue, ethics helps us make the 
correct decision. Ethics helps provide answers to questions like "What should I do, what 
should we do, what goals should we pursue, what laws should we have, what collective 
behavior should we all pursue?" Ethics then is about practical decisionmaking and human 
behavior in the broadest context. Ethics is the premier social science and encompasses 
sociology, economics, psychology, anthropology and history. It is above all about what is 
good and what is evil, and how we come to make such judgments mare, 1952; Moore, 
19861. 
(a) Major Schools of Classical and Coiltemporary Ethics. There are two thousand years 
of organized literature concerned with ethics and it would be presumptuous to attempt a 
review [See Moore, 19861. Nevertheless, there are at feast three critical distinctions in the 
literature which can be used to organize the literature, situate one's analysis in that 
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literature, and of which IT ethicists should therefore be aware. These distinctions are: (i) 
phenomenology vs. positivism, (ii) rules vs. consequences, and (iii) individuals vs. 
collectivities. Figure 1 describes these dimensions and places major ethical schools or 
scholars in their respective areas. 
--- 
Figure 1 
---- 
Below we describe briefly each distinction, and then describe the intersection of these 
dimensions which form schools of ethical thought. 
(i) Phenomenology vs. Positivists. In answer to the question "What should I do", the 
ethical literature divides along a dimension of "givenness" as opposed to empirical 
observation and discovery. For those ethicists that can be called phenomenologists, what 
is good is given in the situation, derived from the logic and language of the situation, or 
from dialogue and debate about "goodness" per se. Positivists, on the other hand argue 
that we should observe the real world and inductively derive ethical principles. 
(ii) Rules vs. Consequences (deontologists vs. consequentialists). Ethicists that are in the 
deontological camp believe good actions result from following the correct rules of 
behavior, which generally are thought to be universal and applicable to all. These rules are 
based on religious beliefs, intuition, or aesthetic belief. Consequentialists, in contrast, 
believe that general rules are not specific enough to guide action, and feel instead that we 
must look to the consequences of our actions, and take those actions which produce the 
best results or consequences. 
(iii) Individuals vs. Collectivities (micro vs. macro levels). Ethicists differ on the locus of 
moral authority even as they agree individual decisionmaking is the proper subject of 
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Collectivity 
(macro) 
Individual 
(micro) 
Figure 1 A Typology of Ethical Theories 
Rules Consequences 
Phenomenologists Positivists 
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ethics. Some argue that moral authority is located in the individual who through self- 
analysis and reflection comes to develop a set or rules, or engages in an analysis of self- 
interest. Others argue that moral authority must be located in larger collectivities -- the 
the organization, society or polity. Both positions carry risks. The former allows 
individuals to set their own rules, their ethics, regardless of society. The latter introduces 
a potential moral relativism of a different sort: whatever the group believes is best 
becomes the rule. 
We argue here that much of much of classical and contemporary ethical thought 
can be arranged in the space created by the intersection of these three dimensions, and that 
four distinct schools of ethical thinking can be derived. Because most if not all rule-based 
ethics are also phenomenological (i.e., they depend on "given" or logical rules) and 
because most if not all positivists are also consequentialists, we have collapsed these two 
dimensions together. 
School I. Collective phenometrologists. This school argues that we should follow rules of 
ethical behavior and that these rules can be derived or do in fact derive from the logic of 
the situation. These rules are species-wide and apply universally. Socrates and Plato 
[1957; 19571 began the debate by positing that "goodness" itself was a form or concept -- 
just like "chair" or "table" -- that could be described and approached by humans even 
though it could never be perfectly grasped. The point of ethics was to discover, through 
dialogue, literature, and language, the nature of goodness, and, once understood, to base 
actions and goals upon it. Kant [1956;1963], and many others to follow, followed a 
similar line. For Kant, the world of "phenomena" was entirely based on species-wide 
categories of human understanding -- categories of pure reason, like cause and effect, 
time, and order. The "real" or noumenol world could never be directly observed. Kant 
believed that the right course of action would be consistent with pure reason, and the 
wrong course of action a violation of reason, a contradiction. For instance, for Kant, the 
answer to the question "Should I throw beer cans on the road as I drive along," would 
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obviously be "No" because if everyone did this it would be impossible for anyone to drive 
along the road. It would lead to a reductio ad absurdum. This reasoning forms the basis 
for categorical imperatives or mles such as "Thou shalt not throw beer cans [or any cans] 
on the road." For both Plato and Kant, the rules of good behavior were collective, 
species-wide, and invariant to consequences. 
School 11. ~iidividzralphenon~eiiogisfs. This school argues that individuals shall come to 
know what is right by looking inward to universal and timeless rules derived from their 
religious belief, intuitions about "rightness," and self analysis. For this group, ethics is 
based on universal duties applicable to all [Ross, 19691, religious precepts such as 
Hebraic, Christian or Islamic ethics [Saint Augustine, 1962; St. Thomas Acquinas, 19621, 
intuition D(oss, 39691 and self analysis [Gauthier, 19701. Many forms of religious ethics, 
although collective in intent, nevertheless involve the individual perceiving a relationship 
to god and are therefore individualistic in practice. 
School 3. Collective coiiseqreiitialists. Schools 3 and 4 differ from groups 1 and 2 in 
that they tell us to look about in the real world to discover empirically what is right and 
wrong rather than rely on rules supposedly "given" in the situation. The collective 
consequentialist school begins with Aristotle [I 970; 19851who argued that we should 
study the actions, laws and mores of different peoples and cultures and inductively arrive 
at a universal database of good acts, laws, and mores. The most powefil positivist 
position is that of the utilitarian John Stuart Mill [I9651 writing in the 18th Century. 
Utilitarianism advised us to take those actions which provided the greatest pleasure for the 
greatest number. Utilitarianism is based on empirical observation (what does in fact work 
and lead to the greatest pleasure), on consequences rather than absolute rules, and on the 
broader collectivity or community--what is good for everyone. Utilitarianism tells us to 
not follow rules blindly, but to maximize the pleasure or welfare of all. 
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A great deal of contemporary ethics of the last twenty years can be found in this 
portion of ethical space -- the union of positivism, consequentialism, and macro or 
collective analysis. Contemporary theorists have extended classical utilitarianism by 
moving away from hedonism and pleasure, instead focusing on social contracts and 
communities. Contractarians like Rawls [I9711 argue that society could be seen as 
originating in a social contract in which fiee individuals chose principles of justice behind a 
"veil of ignorance" that prevented them from knowing their own position in society. 
Under these circumstances, free people would create a society in which to protect 
themselves against worst outcomes, they would insist on (a) the maximum amount of 
liberty consistent with like liberty for others, and (b) a distribution of wealth in which the 
worst off would be as well off as possible (the maximin principle). Based on these 
assumptions about the origin of society, Rawls argued for those actions which empirically 
were consistent with the origins of society, e.g. maximized liberty for all and distributed 
wealth (and other good things) according to the maximin principle. The consequences of 
actions for the collectivity are decisive for Rawls and others in the contract tradition. 
Other theorists in this category are conm~zrnitarians, who ask us to take those actions 
which satis@ the preferences of all [Green, 19941 , and stakeholder analysts [Carroll, 
1989; Freeman, 19841, who ask us to act impartially by taking into account the 
perspectives and interests of all, balancing those interests, and ultimately satisfying all 
interests to at least a minimal degree. ' Most commentators who have focused on ethics 
in various professions such as law, medicine, and IT, and who recommend that 
professionals follow a collectively derived code of ethics fall into this school as well 
The ethics of R.H. Green (1994) poses a problem for this analysis because he suggests we seek rules 
(and hence belongs in the rule based camp) but that these rules should be derived from empirical analysis 
of the consequences of various possible actions. I have classified him as communitarian consequentialist 
because of his emphasis on a society wide consensus empirically understood if not actually the result of a 
vote, and because of his strong stakeholder bias--the omnipartiality which he calls for. 
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because the collectivity--the profession--is the source of ethical advice and direction. The 
Hippocratic oath which, among other recommendations, argues that doctors should at 
least do no harm, is a kind of stakeholder analysis where the key stakeholder is the patient, 
and where the right action depends on an empirical analysis of the situation. We shall 
turn again to these contemporary theories in Section III. 
School 4. Iizdividual coirseqtrentialists. A very different kind of positivism is rooted in 
individual levels of analysis. Theories of institutional economists such as Adam Smith 
argue that social welfare -- at least in an economic sense -- is best served if each individual 
through analysis and experience discovers his or her best selfish interest, and then pursues 
that interest to the full. Here, good acts of individuals in any specific situation are those 
which have good consequences like contributing to social welfare, and these good acts are 
found by empirically examining one's situation, calculating one's options for maximizing 
personal wealth, and pursuing the best option. The competitive market--the "invisible 
handw-- with its price mechanism, enters deus ex machina to resolve individual competition 
into collective maximum social welfare which benefit all [see also Gauthier, 19701. 
Writers and scholars who focus on IT ethics typically fall into the school of 
collective consequentialists when they take ethical stands at all. Indeed, most writers on 
IT ethics build models of the decisionmaking process, empirically gather data on what 
rules people follow, or analyze some issue --like privacy--rather than come up with any 
ethical advice. Yet the strong bias in the literature is the following: when faced with an 
ethical decision, the individual should consult some larger collectivity -- the person's firm 
or professional society -- for advice and to follow that action [Parker, 1988; Johnson, 
1994; Neumann, 19911 . Among the Internet aficionados, there is a strong libertarian 
ethic which argues that individuals should be able to "do what they want, when they want" 
and that the collective social welfare is advanced by the pursuit of a kind of minimally 
organized anarchy [Sterling, 19921. In its moderate form this libertarian argument is a 
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market based, individual consequentialist position, but when carried to an extreme this 
argument may fall out of the ethical space we have described and turn into an amoral fiee- 
for-all with no connection to the collective social welfare. 
(3) Un~fiing themes. While ethicists have many differences, there are also unifling 
themes. Most classical and contemporary ethicists argue, for instance, that ethics involves 
the choices of fiee people, who are informed and rational. All agree that under these 
conditions, individuals are responsible, accountable, and liable, and that a good society is 
one in which due process obtains, that is, there is a fair and impartial process exists for 
determining responsibility, accountability and liability. These are not empirical matters to 
be discovered, but rather the logical conditions required for there to be any ethics, or 
debate about ethics, whatsoever [Johnson, 1994 , chapter 71. 
In general, ethicists do not admit the argument of "just following orders" as an 
excuse for unethical individual acts. Neither do they admit "forces of history" or other 
exceptions to accountability. There are no ethical "invisible hands" in the moral 
marketplace which relieves individuals of responsibility for their actions, and all action 
must be attributed to human agents. For IT ethics these uniwng themes are very 
important, as we describe below, for they mean that it is morally unacceptable to claim 
you acted, or something happened, "because the computer did it" or "the computer told 
me to do it." 
(c) Limits to ethical behavior. Can good people take bad actions? Can good 
organizations commit unethical acts [Gellennan, 1986]? How can these events happen if 
the correct process and method of ethical analysis is in place and used? Scholars have 
begun to realize empirical limits to moral behavior. Among these limitations are (i) a 
bounded moral rationality which limits the precision of calculating "best outcomes,'" 
ponaldson and Dunfee, 19941, (ii) uncertainty in which new situations require different 
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responses from the past, (iii) situational specificity in which each situation is so unique that 
the existing set of rules is inapplicable, and (iv) opportunism caused by other actors 
"gaming" the situation, taking extreme positions which do not reflect their expected 
outcomes (especially harmkl to consequentialist positions). Many of these limitations are 
the same as those posited in transaction economics [Williamson, 19851 and the similarities 
are deliberate insofar as the moral contractor faces the same limitations as the economic 
contractor. 
. . 
For an IT ethics these are important considerations. They suggest for instance that 
good people, and good organizations, following good procedures, will nevertheless make 
mistakes, perhaps the more so as technological environments are uncertain, and new 
situations so commonplace. Nevertheless, individuals and collectivities remain 
accountable and damages may be assessed for mistakes under these conditions. 
(d) m e  te~zsio~t between individtrals and collecti~ities. Is it possible for people to be 
ethical and good in an evil society, or an evil organization? What is the ethical meaning of 
the statement "He [She] was a good Nazi" or "She [He] is a good chess player?" Should a 
person follow "bad" or "evil" laws? Are all Americans now living responsible for the 
atrocities committed by American forces in Vietnam? Should individual white males pay 
reparations to individual white females in the form of jobs and wages to compensate for 
past discrimination against the group of white females? 
Each of these difficult questions reflects the ethical tension in all ethical thinking 
between the individual and the larger collectivity--the group, the organization, the society. 
For the most part, the ethics literature uses a language appropriate to biological, living, 
individual, human beings. This language is not easily transferred to larger collectivities. 
For some ethicists, all rational "formal organizations are not moral persons, and have no 
moral responsibilities, they have no moral rights" (Ladd, 1970;) and "there is one and only 
one responsibility of business. ... to increase its profits Friedman, 1965; 19701. The 
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language of ethics in this view does not apply to organizations any more than it applies to, 
say, the game of chess and its players. For others, formal organizations are moral persons 
not merely because they are the subject of rights but because formal organizations act with 
intention and in accordance with a formal, corporate decision structure (French, 1979). 
Any organizations which meet the criteria of what is known as a "Davidsonian agent" -- an 
intentionally acting entity -- are therefore moral entities which can be held responsible and 
accountable. Mobs and statistical groups, in this theory, are not moral agents. In this 
view, the statistical aggregate, "white males", may not be held responsible, accountable or 
liable for past discrimination against another statistical aggregate, "white females." In 
contrast, an entity like the United States government could be held responsible for the 
actions of its agents now or in the past because it fits the criteria for a Davidsonian agent 
pavidson, 197 11. 
The tension between individuals and groups is especially challenging for School 3 - 
- the collective consequentialists. This school is critically dependent on the larger 
collectivity providing guidance to individuals. But if the collectivity is evil, how then 
should individuals proceed? Reliance on "professional codes of conduct", which may 
themselves be corrupted by professional self interest, pose significant problems which we 
address in Section II. 
(e) 73e situation of iifornzafion technology. What is the moral significance of such 
- *  
statements as "Computers flatten hierarchies," or "Computers eliminate the need for 
middle managers" or statements of the form "Computers do X" where X is any social 
consequent? From an ethical point of view, these statements are amoral because they 
substitute impersonal forces--technology--for human agency. This way of thinking and 
speaking removes human agency from the events described. The actor in such sentences 
and thinking becomes an impersonal, non-moral force, which acts on society presumably 
without human intervention. But are such assessments empirically correct? If so, we have 
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a difficult situation: a real empirical world which is inherently amoral. But as it turns out, 
there is little support for these assessments in the area of infbrmation technology or any 
other technology in human history. 
An ethics of information systems is impossible without an understanding of how 
information technologies affect human choice, human action, and human potential. 
Societies do not stand naked before technological change, swept along before the tide, as 
some popular journalists intimate. Historically, societies react to technological change by 
mitigating its influence, civilizing the change, compensating injured individuals, attempting 
to restore balances struck over centuries. For instance, one major response of all industrial 
societies to vast increases in productivity brought about by modern technology has been to 
reduce the work week fiom over 60 hours in 1900 to less than 40 hours in 1990 [Leontief, 
19861. Broadcast technology was tamed and regulated by the Communications Act of 
1934. Technology, in other words, does not stand "outside" of society, acting upon it, but 
instead technology--its manufacturers, benefactors, users--is a social phenomenon itself 
subject to all the constraints of other social actors. Among these constraints is the notion 
of social responsibility: you can and will be held accountable for your actions. 
Critical to our ethical understanding is the realization that information technology 
does not impact society like some iceberg colliding with a ship at sea on a stormy night 
baudon, 19741. Rather, more than twenty years of research on the relationship between 
organizations and information technology has established that there is a two way 
relationship between information technology and organizations and society (Laudon, 
1974; 1986; 1994; Kling, 1974; King and Kraemer, 1986; Orlikowski, 1992). On the one 
hand, IT confronts individuals, organizations, and societies as an "objective" reality, 
providing obvious opportunities for action and constraints on its use at a particular 
moment in history, in a particular society. Organizations must cope with, adjust, adapt to 
these realities in order to survive. On the other hand, IT is a socially enacted phenomenon 
both in its design, use, and implementation. There are significant and meaninghi 
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voluntaristic--"subjective"-- elements of information technology. Social actors make 
choices--sometimes alone and sometimes in larger macro cultures like trade associations, 
industry alliances, governments, and professional groups-- about what goals the new 
technology will pursue, what meaning the new technology has, how it will be 
implemented, and what ethical, social, and political consequences are tolerable, moral, and 
acceptable. 
Empirically, just about anything can happen when computers are added to 
organizational life. Empirical research finds that computers can become icons or practical 
tools, can aid the existing workforce or decimate it, can expand the cognitive content of 
work or shrink it, can decentralize organizations or turn them into well articulated and 
micro-managed hierarchies, and can add to productivity or have little impact paudon, 
19941. Whatever result occurs is empirically the result of managers and other human 
beings who participate in a decisionmaking structure. 
Given these basic concepts of classical and contemporary ethics, what can we 
recommend then as a beginning to specific IT ethics? 
IL A Descriptive Map of Issues and Levels 
To develop an ethics which is uniquely applicable to the IT arena requires that we 
(a) map the unique issues and situations which are effected by IT, (b) propose some 
methodology which can be applied to these issues and situations, and (c) address the 
tensions between individuals and collectivities. 
Figure 2 illustrates the IT ethics map we propose. There are two elements to this 
ethics : (a) a descriptive map of the ethical landscape, and (b) a community-based theory 
of social contracting which generates rules of conduct appropriate to all situations at 
different levels faced by all moral agents. We describe the nonnative theory in the 
following section 111. 
--------- 
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Figure 2 
We argue, based on a review of extant texts and articles dealing with IT ethics, 
that there are five major constellations of issues in IT ethical space [Johnson, 1994; 
Dejoie, Fowler and Paradice, 199 1 ; Forrester and Morrison, 19901 . These constellations 
are: (1) information rights and obligations, (2) property rights and obligations, (3) system 
quality, (4) accountability and control, and (5) quality of life. While this mapping is not 
logically exhaustive, and there may be other schemas for categorizing the universe of 
issues, we believe that this particular mapping is usefbl as a guide to IT ethics for 
practitioners, researchers, and students. In addition, we argue that ethical issues arise at 
four significant levels: the individual, the organization, the polity, and society. An IT 
ethics must address ethical action at each level. 
Below we briefly explore this issue map, pointing out illustrative ethical issues 
raised at various levels of ethical analysis. In many instances we illustrate our analysis 
with examples of laws and legal conflicts because the law provides a usehl indicator of 
underlying ethical and social conflicts raised by the new information technologies. 
(I) Irlforn~ation rights attd obligations. Because information technologies primarily effect 
traditional rights and obligations of with respect to information, this ethical dimension of 
IT has received considerable research attention. Information rights are usually defined by 
claims to privacy and claims to access (freedom of information). Privacy is the claim of 
individuals to be left alone, free from surveillance [Westin, 1967; Gavison, 1980; 
Hirshleifer, 19801. Freedom of information is the claim to access and use information 
necessary to be an informed citizen in a democracy (Westin, 1967). These claims are 
protected by a wide variety of private policies, common law, constitutional, and statutory 
provisions in the U.S. and other societies. [USDHEW, 1993; Traver, 19941. Despite 
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Figure 2 
A Communitarian Social Contracts Theory of IT Ethics 
Information Rights 
and Obligations 
Property Rights 
and Obligations 
Acwuntab'ility 
and Control 
Macr contracts] 
System 
Quality 
Quality of Life 
Caption: IT ethics deals with a specific subset of issues. These issues 
arise in different contexts, from the individual to thc group, organization, 
polity, and society. Ethical issues can be resolved by considering the 
general principles and rules which free, rational humans would propose 
as the foundation for civilized life beginning with the small groups in which 
you participate directly (micro contracts) and then extending to the larger 
groups in which you participate indirectly (macro contracts). 
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these protections, 83% of Americans in a recent poll indicate that they are concerned 
about threats to their personal privacy, and 85% blame computer technology? 
ParridPrivacy and American Business Poll, 19931. 
Because information technology creates new opportunities to deny privacy and 
inhibit access to information, ethical questions are posed to individuals and larger 
collectivities [Wolinsky and Sylvester, 19921. Some illustrations: Under what conditions 
should I invade the privacy of others close to me? Should organizations monitor their 
employees' phone conversations and workplace chit-chat? Should the polity give law 
enforcement organizations the right to secretly decrypt digital communications? Should 
we, as a society, encourage expectations of privacy beyond the protections of one's home, 
say, to one's garbage, one's car, one's telephone calls from a cellular telephone or one's 
electronic mail? 
(2) Property rights aitd obligatioils. Information technologies and systems have severely 
challenged existing law and social practices which in the past protected intellectual 
property. Intellectual properties are the tangible and intangible products of the intellect 
created by individuals and corporations. Intellectual property is protectable under one or 
more or three different legal traditions: trade secret, copyright, and patent law. Each 
provides different kinds of protections (Black: 1979: 1095). However, the broad intent of 
all forms of intellectual property law is to ensure that inventions and ideas are quickly 
adopted and disseminated in commerce and the arts by ensuring the creators of new ideas 
and inventions shall be rewarded for their efforts [Hirshleifer, 19711. 
Trade secrets involves the claim that one has created a unique formula, device, 
pattern, or compilation of data which is not in the public domain. Copyrights involve the 
claim of exclusive rights to the expression of an idea (not the idea itself). Copyrights are 
the principle mechanisms for protecting literature, music, artwork, and the like. Patents 
involve the claim of exclusive rights to the original and novel ideas behind an invention for 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stern School of Business 
Working Paper IS-94-09 
a limited period (seventeen years in most cases). Patents are protected by federal law (the 
first being in 1 836). 
Information technology and systems are typically used to create intellectual 
property. Because this property requires considerable investment to create, its protection 
against appropriation without compensation is vital. However, each of the existing 
avenues of legal protection have significant limitations when it comes to protecting IT- 
related intellectual property [Graham, 1984; Samuelson, 199 1 ; 199 1 ; 19931. Trade secret 
law may provide some limited protection, but often is inapplicable because it is difficult to 
prevent IT-related intellectual property from falling into the public domain. Copyright law 
covers software, but since it fails to protect underlying ideas, it is easy for competitors to 
"steal" one's concepts without technically enfringing on the work. Patents can also be 
used to protect IT-related software and other inventions, but are very difficult, time 
consuming and expensive to obtain. Finally, because digital works are so easily replicated, 
transmitted, altered, and made so compact, theft and misappropriation is easy and cheap. 
Slight alterations to an image can make it "unique" and therefore tempting to copy the 
original and alter it slightly. 
Thus, new information technologies are challenging existing social practice and 
laws in the property rights arena. IT poses a number of unique difficulties in establishing 
responsibility, accountability and liability for property rights violations. Among the ethical 
questions that have arisen in this area are: Should I copy software that I use at work for 
my personal use at home? What rules should we as an organization adopt to prevent our 
members fiom misappropriating protected works in the course of business? What laws 
should we support to protect intellectual property? What social expectations should we 
encourage with respect to information-based property (for instance, should, as some 
believe, all information be "fiee")? 
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3, Accout~tability, Liability and Control. Because of the complexity of many IT systems, 
because of the long chain of events and decisions which shape the emergence of IT 
applications, and because of the uncertainties surrounding the use and proper operation of 
IT based systems, information technology poses novel questions of accountability, liability, 
and control. 
Traditionally there are three categories of liability that courts use to deal with 
claims that products or services have caused physical or economic injury to consumers: 
breach of warranty, negligence, and strict liability tort. Breach of warranty occurs when a 
seller expressly or impliedly represents to a buyer that the goods or services being sold are 
of good quality and fit for their intended use, or that services will be performed in a 
particular manner. Negligence occurs when a product causes physical or economic harm 
to individuals, when the injury could have, and should have been prevented, and when the 
producer has a "duty to care" about the consumer of the product. Negligence requires 
fault. Strict liability in tort is a separate class of liability which arises whenever a defective 
product causes injury. In these cases, individuals can bring suits against the manufacturer 
independent of the question of fault, warranty, or duty to care. In other words, a 
manufacturer of a defective product that injures people can be held strictly liable 
regardless of whether or not he could have, or should have, prevented the defect. 
It is very difficult to fit IT-based products into these existing legal doctrines. For 
instance, who should be held liable if a person is injured by a software product in some 
way, shape or form? The legal system has responded to this dilemma by trying to fit 
software into the existing legal schema by analogizing it to machines, books or services 
(arenas where there are precedents for action) although in many instances the analogy may 
not be very apt.2 The legal results vary depending on which analogy is chosen, creating 
For instance, software is usually quite different from a book. Unlike book users, 
software users often develop expectations of infallibility about their software; software is 
less easily inspected than a book; quality comparisons are more difficult; most software 
perform a task rather than describes a task as a book does; and finally, software-based 
services in many instances are much more central to everyday lives than books. 
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unprincipled distinctions and leaving much open to question. Thus, if the software is seen 
as being part of a machine, breach of warranty, negligence and strict liability may apply, 
and the manufacturer of the software may be held liable. If the software in question is 
seen as acting more like a book, storing and displaying information, courts have been 
reluctant to hold its "authors", publishers and sellers liable under any theory for its 
contents, regardless of the physical or economic harm that may have resulted. If software 
is viewed as a service, breach of warranty may apply if the seller has made specific 
warranties about the performance of the service, but negligence and strict liability theories 
will likely not. 
Thus, new information technologies are challenging existing liability law and social 
practices for holding individuals and institutions accountable [Samuelson, 1993; Straub, 
1990; Mykyten and Mykyton and Slinkman, 19901. A number of new ethical questions 
are posed in this arena. 
As discussed above, a central issue is who should be held accountable, responsible 
and liable for the consequences of the use of information technologies. What 
responsibilities should the user assume? What about the organizations (and the individuals 
involved) that create, produce, sell and profit from those products? What expectations 
should society allow to develop around service-providing information systems that are fast 
becoming integral to daily life, such as ATM services? Should the users of such systems 
assume the risk that such systems will occasionally fail, or should the organizations that 
have made them so ubiquitous be held strictly liable for any disruption in service? Issues 
surrounding accountability, liability and control are also at the heart of political debates 
over censorship and free speech on computer networks and electronic bulletin boards. 
Should network and bulletin board system operators be allowed to control what is 
expressed over a network or bulletin board, much as a newspaper or broadcaster does, or 
should they be analogized to common carriers like the telephone system, without any 
control over (or liability for) what users transmit? 
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4. Systems Qtrality. The debate over liability and accountability for unintentional 
consequences of system use raises a related but independent moral dimension: what is an 
acceptable, technologically feasible level of system quality? At what point should system 
managers say, "Stop testing, we've done all we can to perfect this software. Ship it!" 
There are three sources of poor system quality: software bugs and errors, 
hardware or facility failures due to natural or other causes, and poor input data quality 
(Laudon and Laudon, 1994; Neuman, 1993; Loch, Carr, and Warkentin, 1992). 
Obviously, individuals and organizations cannot be held responsible or liable for "acts of 
God" or technologically unavoidable errors. However, they may be held responsible for 
avoidable or foreseeable consequences, which they have a duty to perceive and correct. 
But, there is a gray area: some system errors are foreseeable and correctable only at very 
great expense, an expense so great that pursuing this level of perfedion is economically 
not feasible-- no one could afford the product. It is commonly agreed that zero defects in 
software code of any complexity cannot be achieved and the seriousness of remaining 
bugs cannot be estimated. Hence there is a technological barrier to perfect software and 
users must be aware of the potential for catastrophic failure. 
The central quality-related ethical issue at the individual and organizational level is 
at what point should software or services be released for consumption by others, at what 
point can one conclude that the software or service achieves an economically and 
technologically adequate level of quality? What is the individual and the organization 
obliged to know about the quality of the software, its procedures for testing and its 
operational characteristics? 
At the societal level, the ethical question is : do we want as a society to encourage 
people to believe that systems are infallible, and that data errors are impossible, or do we 
instead want a society where people are openly skeptical and questioning of the output of 
machines, where people are at least informed of the risk? By heightening awareness of 
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system failure, do we inhibit the development of all systenis which in the end contribute to 
social well being? On the political level, the leading issues concern the laws of 
responsibility and accountability. Should we encourage Congress to impose quality 
standards on industry or instead look to industry associations or the marketplace to 
establish and enforce such standards? 
5. Quality oflife. Not all sins are crimes. Technology gives much, but it takes away or 
destroys as well. The negative social costs of introducing information technologies and 
systems are beginning to mount as the power of the technology bounds upwards. Many of 
these negative social consequences are not violations of the individual rights defended by 
the Constitution, common law, or statute; neither are they property crimes, or crimes of 
any sort. Nevertheless, these negative consequences can be extremely harmkl to 
individuals, organizations, societies, and polities. Information technologies potentially can 
destroy valuable elements of our culture and society even while they bring us benefits. If 
there is a balance of good and bad consequences to the use of information systems, who 
do we hold responsible for the bad consequences? 
Among the leading "quality of life" ethical issues are: 
Balancing Power: Center 17s. Periphery. At alternative times in our history, IT has either a 
centralizing or decentralizing effect [King and Kraemer, 1986; Laudon, 19861. Should 
steps be taken to encourage one effect as opposed to the other? 
Buffer Redzrction and Rapid Change. IT applications reduce time and distance which in 
the past buffered economic and social institutions from rapid change. What should be 
done, if anything, about information technology-driven time-based competition that may 
result in the rapid decline of businesses and other organizations which cannot cope?. 
Maintenance of Social Boltndaies New information technologies, coupled with the 
growth of knowledge work occupations, mean that more and more people are working 
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when traditionally they would have been spending time with family, friends or relaxing 
[Barlow, 19911. Should the trend toward ubiquitous computing be allowed to continue, 
even if in hrther blumng the boundaries of work and family, it weakens important social 
institutions like the family unit. 
Dependence and Vulnerability. A number of researchers have argued that we are 
becoming too dependent on critical applications with little understanding, and no social 
oversight, of the complex systems on which we rely [Borning, 1987; Bulkeley, 1992;U. S. 
GAO, '19921. Whether it is telephone switching systems, ATM networks, or air traffic 
control systems, the literature is rife with examples of poorly backed-up systems, little 
understanding of failure modes, and little analysis of risk. Who bears ultimate 
responsibility for this development -- individuals, organizations, governments? 
Eqtrify and Access. Information and knowledge, and access to new information and 
knowledge, is inequitably distributed in the U.S. There is some reason to believe that 
intensive IT applications growth heightens social inequities absent social interventions 
W.S. Center for Education Statistics, 1990; Laudon and Laudon, 1994, Chapter 201. 
What, if anything, should be done to ensure that everyone has an equal opportunity to 
participate in the digital age? 
Health Risks. In 1980 at the beginning of the PC revolution no one thought that by 1992 
businesses would be paying $20 billion a year to compensate and treat victims of repetitive 
stress syndrome (SRT), andlor computer vision syndrome (CVS). According to some 
(Brod, 1982; McPartlin, 1990), exposure to computer intensive environments is a major 
factor in stress disease. Who should be responsible for preventing RSIs -- the 
manufacturer of IT equipment, the individual who uses the equipment, or the organization 
who employes the individual? 
From this brief overview of major issue constellations we can see a very large 
diversity of concerns and debates, values and attitudes, stakeholders, and competing 
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social interests. What recommendations can we make to our students, practitioners, and 
researchers for dealing with this diversity of ethical issues? Below we suggest one 
possibility. 
III. A Communitarian Social Contracts Theory 
How should individuals make ethical choices when confronting IT issues? One 
possibility widely discussed in contemporary applied ethics may be labeled communitarian 
social contract theory because it is based on the theory of social contracts which has a 
long tradition in western thought from Plato's Republic [450 B.C./1957], to Hobbes' state 
of nature [I65 1/1946], John Locke [1690/1948], Rousseau [I76211 9691 and most recently 
John Rawls [1971).] The essence of social contract theory is a thought experiment 
designed to elicit the general principles which rational human beings would propose as the 
foundation for organized social life as an alternative to Hobbes' primitive state of nature. 
We call this the nlacro social contract. 
However, as Donaldson and Dunfee [I9941 have pointed out, the macro social 
contract is too unspecific, too general, and ill suited for guidance in many local situations. 
While Rawls posited a "veil of ignorance" that blinded the macro social contractors to 
their own position in society, and hence assured fairness, Donaldson and Dunfee argue 
that any macro contract results from a broad consensus of all interested parties. They feel 
that the general principle at all levels of contracting is the one suggested by R. H. Green 
(1994): "neutral omnipartial rule-making" descendent from Rawls' notion that we should 
think of morality and ethics as a kind of pziblic legislation where any rules or judgments 
must reflect the honest, free consens2/s of all invol~)edparties. 
Donaldson and Dunfee extend beyond Rawls and Green by arguing that the macro 
contract by itself is insufficient, and that the contracting process also occurs at lower level 
in a series of micro contracts. The macro contractors agree to create free moral space in 
which local groups can develop their own rules based on local and situtational differences 
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as long as the macro contract is not violated. These micro contracts can involve small 
work groups, departments, divisions, whole organizations, and the polity itself [see Figure 
21. As one traverses to higher levels, the constraints of the macro social contract become 
more operative. In this sense, our theory is contmunitarian because it relies on 
progressively wider and more comprehensive communities as a guide for individual 
behavior in any given situation. 
What are the limits on moral free space for micro contractors? What are the limits 
on macro contractors? It is conceivable, once we give up Rawls' "veil of ignorance," that 
macro contractors themselves might create a contract which systematically deprives some 
minority group -- although this would seem unlikely given the constraint of free consensus 
among all parties to a macro contract. Perhaps the greatest danger is that local micro 
contracts would be woefblly biased against other micro groups and we would end up with 
a self-serving cultural relativism. The Data Processing Management Association might 
adopt a rule requiring all members to drop their membership in other professional 
associations or be expelled. Comrnunitarians like Taylor [1989] and Donaldson and 
Dunfee [I9941 posit a set of hyperitorms applicable across cultures and societies as final 
check on all contracts. Anthropologists, sociologists, and political scientists have 
developed a sizable literature on universal social norms which at least can serve as an 
indicator of hypernorms if not a definitive statement of them. Such norms as a 
proscription against murder, slavery, piracy, adequate health and safety can be seen as 
underlying tenets for founding documents like the Helsinki Final Act and other 
international agreements in labor, trade, and technology. 
IV. The Theory Applied 
Let us suppose then you are a member of the senior management of Proctor and 
Gamble in 1991. An employee has leaked private corporate information to the Wall Street 
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Journal concerning a change in top management which may effect the stock price. Eleven 
other senior executives decide this leak must be plugged, the guilty employee discovered, 
and terminated before fbrther damage is done, to set an example to other employees 
pothenberg, 19911. They recommend the local, fiiendly District Attorney subpoena all 
phone records fiom the 5 13 area code in the last year, identify all those calls made to the 
Wall Street Journal number, and fbrther identify which of those calls were made by 
Proctor and Gamble employees. Once identified, these employees would be terminated. 
The District Attorney and the local police agree to cooperate because state law in Ohio 
prohibits disclosing corporate information to anyone including the press and therefore a 
law may have been violated. The local Bell Operating Company also agrees to these 
actions. There is no federal statute which prohibits such mass surveillance, and no 
violation of the First Amendment which protects fieedom of speech and association fiom 
government interference (but does not prohibit firms from terminating employees for their 
public statements). Should you support this action? As outsiders, should we support or 
condemn this action? 
There is a strong consensus in the inner management circle that the leak must stop 
and be punished. The privacy of the firm has been breached, and laws potentially violated. 
Problems arise as we leave the smaller inner circle. Would Proctor Gamble employees 
support as a general rule the surveillance of their phone calls--especially their private calls 
made off premises? Would all other citizens (non-employees) in the 513 area code 
support as a general rule surveillance of their calls in order to catch a single Proctor 
Gamble employee who may have violated a law? In the larger polity and society there is 
little support for giving private firms the ability to surveil the private phone calls of 
millions of ordinary citizens simply to catch a single employee who may have leaked some 
information. 
In this instance, then, you could not support the action recommended by your 
colleagues, and we, as outsiders, would have to condemn this action because it violates 
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the authentic consensus of many micro contracts and at the societal level violates the 
broader macro contract. 
V. Conclusion 
In order for there to be an effective IT applied ethics, as a field we need methods 
for arriving at ethically correct decisions which, on one hand, take into account the 
specificity of local situations and the uncertainties posed by rapid developing technology. 
On the other hand, we need methods which do not violate larger macro level 
understandings and principles. Social contract theory is a useful vehicle for generating 
neutral, omnipartial rules that can guide social action at a number of different levels. 
However, problems remains and the method is not foolproof. 
This method does not overcome the most severe test of any ethics: so what? The 
"so what" argument here is simply that just because an action violates a series of micro 
and macro contracts, so what? I may violate these contracts, but most people will follow 
these contracts, and for the most part society will go on. Society remains vulnerable to 
opportunists. Neither does this method overcome the related problem of deriving an 
"ought" from an "is" [Hume, 175 1119551. No set of factual statements describing social 
contracts is sufficient to generate an ought, as Hume pointed out long ago. And the 
dependence of the theory on hypernorms which appear deus ex machina to check potential 
self-serving relativism of local communities and potentially criminal societies and 
organizations, is disturbing. More research is needed in the area of global international 
coinmunities and the potential for global macro contracts which can act as constraints on 
micro contracting. These caveats aside, social contracting theory and communitarian 
perspectives offer a useful extension beyond utilitarianism and stakeholder analysis, and a 
useful area to begin the debate over a practical, normative IT ethics. 
References 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stern School of Business 
Working Paper IS-94-09 
Aristotle. The Politics. Translated by T.A. Sinclair. Pneguin Books, Baltimore, 1970. 
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Hackett, Indianapolis, Indiana, 1985. 
Barlow, John Perry, "Electronic Frontier: Private Life in Cyberspace," Commzinications of 
theACM34, no. 8 (August 1991). 
Black, Henry J. Black's Law Dictionary. West Publishing, St. Paul, Minnesota, 1979. 
Borning, Alan, "Computer System Reliability and Nuclear War," Communications of the 
ACM, 30,2, February 1987. 
Brod, Craig J. Techno Stress- 7he Human Cost ofthe Compziter Rel~olution. Reading 
MA: Addison-Wesley, 1982. 
Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp. 960F2D1465 (Ninth Circuit, 1992). 
Bulkeley, William M. "Databases Plagued by a Reign of Error. " 7he Wall Street Journal 
(May 26, 1992). 
Cafasso, Rosemary. "Rethinking Reengineering. " Conlputerrr~orld (March 1 5, 1993) 
Carroll, A.B., Business and Society: Ethics and Stakeholder Management, Cincinnati, 
Ohio, Southwestern Publishing, 1989. 
Cohen, Eli and Larry Cornwell, "A Question of Ethics: Developing Information Systems 
Ethics," in Dejoie, Roy, George Fowler, and David Paradice, eds. Ethical Isszies in 
I~formation Systems. Boston: Boyd & Fraser, 199 1, 
Couger, J. Daniel, "Preparing IS Students to Deal With Ethical Issues," MIS Quarterly, 
13,2, June 1989. 
Davidson, Donald. "Agency," in Agent, Action, and Reason, ed, by Binkley, Bronaugh 
and Marras Publishing, Toronto, 1971. 
Dejoie, Roy, George Fowler, and David Paradice, eds. Ethical Ismes in Itformation 
Systems. Boston: Boyd & Fraser, 1991. 
Dejoie, Roy, George Fowler, and David Paradice, A Framework for the Study of 
Information Systems and Ethical Decision-making Processes, in Dejoie, Roy, George 
Fowler, and David Paradice, eds. Ethical Ismes in bformation Systems. Boston: Boyd & 
Fraser, 1 99 1. 
Donaldson, Thomas and Thomas W. Dunfee, "Toward a Unified Conception of Business 
Ethics: Integrative Social Contracts Theory," Academy of Management Review, vol 19, 
NO. 2,223-284, 1994. 
Donaldson, Thomas W. and Patricia Werhane, Ethical Issues in Business, Prentice Hall, 
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, , 1 993. 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stern School of Business 
Working Paper IS-94-09 
Fletcher, J. Introduction to Clinical Ethics and Health Care, New York, Macmillan, 1990. 
Forester, Tom and Perry Morrison, Computer Ethics. MIT Press, Cambridge, 
Mass., 1990. 
Freeman, R.E., Strategic Management: a Stakeholder Approach, Boston, 
Pitman/Ballinger, 1984. 
French, Peter A. "The Corporation as a Moral Person," American Philosophical Quaterly, 
(3). 1979, pp. 2076-21 5. 
Friedman, Milton. Capitalism and Freedom. Anchor Books, New York, 1965. 
. . 
Friedman, Milton. "The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Profits," The New 
York Times Magazine, September 13, 1970. 
Gauthier, David P., [ed], Morality and Rational Self-Interest, Oford, England, Oxford 
University Press, 1970. 
Gavison, Ruth. "Privacy and the Limits of Law," The Yale Law Journal 89, No. 3, January 
1980. 
Gellerman, Saul W. "Why Managers Make Bad Ethical Choices," Harvard Business 
Review, July-August, 1 986. 
Graham, Robert L. "The Legal Protection of Computer Software. " Commtcnications of 
the A C" (May 1984). 
Green, R.H., The Ethical Manager, Macmillan, New York 1994. 
Hammer, Michael, and James Champy, Reengineering the Corporation, Harper Collins, 
New York 1993 
*Hare, RM. The Language of Morals. 1952 
Harris, Louis and Privacy and American Business Magazine. New Privacy Surveys 
Report, 1994. Hackensack, New Jersey, 1993. 
Hirshleifer, J., The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive 
Activity, 61 Am. Econ. Rev. 561(1971) 
Hirshleifer, J.,Privacy: Its Origins, Function and Future, 9 J. Legal Studies 649 (1980) 
Hume, David. An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. (175 1) In Human an 
Inquiry Concerning Huan Understanding, Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1955. 
Johnson, Deborah G., Computer Ethics 2nd Edition, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 
N.J., 1994. 
Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals. Translated by H.J. Paton. 
Harper Books, New York, 1956. 
27 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stern School of Business 
Working Paper IS-94-09 
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by N. K. Smith. Macmillan, 
Londaon, 1963. 
Khalil, Omar E., "Artificial Decision-making and Artificial Ethics: A Management 
Concern," Journal of Business Ethics, 12,4, April 1993. 
King, John and Kenneth Kraemer, "The Dynamics of Change in Computing Use: a 
Theoretical Framework," Computers, Environment, and Urban Systems 1 l(1) 1986. 
Kling, Rob, "Automated Welfare Tracking and Service Integration, " communications of 
the ACM, 2 l(6) 1 974. 
Kling, Rob. "When Organizations Are Perperrators: The Conditions of Computer Abuse 
and Computer Crime." In Conputerizafion and Controversy: Valtie Conflicts and Social 
Choices, ed. Charles Dunlop and Rob Kling. New York: Academic Press, 1991. 
Kling, Rob, "Computer Abuse and Computer Crime as Organizational Activities," 
Computers and Law Journal, 2, Spring 1980. 
Ladd, John. "Morality and the Ideal of Rationality in Formal Organizations," The Monist, 
LaSalle, Illinois, 1970. 
LaChat, Michael R., "Artificial Intelligence and Ethics: An Exercise in the Moral 
Imagination," A1 Magazine, 7, No. 2, 70-79, 1986. 
Laudon, Kenneth C., Computers and Bureaucratic Reform, Wiley, New York: 1974. 
Laudon, Kenneth C., Dossier Society: Values Choices in the Design of National 
Information Systems, Columbia University Press, New York 1986. 
Laudon, Kenneth C. and Kenneth Marr, "Productivity and the Enactment of a Macro 
Culture," Paper given at ICIS, Vancouver, December 1994. Center For Research on 
Information Systems , Stem School of Business. 
Laudon, Kenneth C. and Jane P. Laudon, Management Information Systems: Organization 
and Technology, 3rd edition. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice Hall, 1994. 
Leontief, Wassily, "The Distribution of Work and Income," Scientific American, 
December, 1986 
Lewis, Carol W,, "Ethics and Information Technology: Operating in Virtuous Reality," 
Public Manager, 22,2, Summer 1 993. 
Loch, Karen D., Houston H. arr, and Meriil E. Warkentin, "Threats to Information 
Systems: Today's Reality, Yesterday's Understanding," MIS Quarterly, 16, 2, June 1992. 
Locke, John. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 
1960. 
McPartlin, John P. "The Terrors of Technostress. " ItlfontationFEEK (July 30, 1 990) 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stern School of Business 
Working Paper IS-94-09 
Markoff, John. "Though Illegal, Copied Software is Now Common." B e  New York Times 
(July 27, 1992). 
Markoff, John. "Wrestling Over the Key to Codes, " The New York Times (May 9, 1993). 
Mason, Richard 0. "Four Ethical Issues in the Information Age. MIS Quarterly 10, no. 1 
(March 1986). 
Mill, J.S. Utilitarianism. In Max Lerner (ed.) Essential Works of John Stuart Mill, Bantam 
Books, New York, 1965. 
*Moore, G. E., Ethics, 2nd edition. 
Mykytyn, Kathleen, Peter P. Mykytyn, Jr., and Craig W. Slinkman, "Expert Systems: A 
Question of Liability," MIS Qtrarterly 14, no. 1 (March 1990). 
Neumann, Peter G. "Inside RISKS: Computers, Ethics and Values." Communications of 
the ACA434, no. 87 (July 1991). 
Neuman, Peter G., "Risks Considered Global(ly)," Communications of the ACM, 35, 1, 
January 1993. 
Ottensmeyer, Edward J. and Mark A. Heroux, "Ethics, Public Policy, and Managing 
Advanced Technologies: The Case of Electronic Surveillance," Journal of Business Ethics, 
10, 7, July 1991. 
Orlikowski, Wanda J:, "The Duality of Technology: Rethinking the Concept of 
Technology in Organizations," Organization Science, Vol. 3 (3) August 1992. 
Oz, Efljr, "Ethical Standards for Information Systems Professionals," MIS Quarterly 16, 
no. 4 (December 1 992). 
Oz, Em. "Ethical Standards for Information Systems Professionals: A Case for a Univfied 
Code," MIS Quarterly, 16,4, December 1992. 
Oz, Effy. "Ethical Standards for Computer Professionals: A Comparative Analysis of Four 
Major Codes," Journal of Business Ethics, 12,9, September 1993. 
Parker, Donn and Susan Swope, and Bruce N. Baker, Ethical Conflicts in Information and 
Computer Science, Technology, and Business. QED Information Sciences, Wellesley, 
Mass., 1990. 
Parker, Donn B., Fighting Computer Crime, Charles Scribner and Sons, New York, 1983. 
Parker, Donn B., "Ethics for Information Systems Personnel," Journal of Information 
Systems Management, 5,3, Summer 1988. 
Plato. The Theaetetus and the Sophist. Translated by F.M. Cornford. Bobbs-Merrill, 
New York, 1957. 
Plato. The Republic. Translated by F.M. Cornford. Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1957. 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stern School of Business 
Working Paper IS-94-09 
Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1971. 
Riflcin, Glenn. "The Ethics Gap." Computem~orld (October 14, 1991). 
*Ross, W.D., Moral Duties. Macrnillan, London, 1969 
Rothenberg, Randall. "Search for Ne3ws Leaks Spurs Ohio Phone Sweep," The New 
York Times, August 1 6, 199 1. 
Rousseau, J. J., The Social Contract, New York: Anchor-Doubleday, 1969. 
Saint Augustine. The City of God. In Katz, Nochlin, and Stover (eds) Writers on Ethics. 
D. Van Nostrand, Princeton, New Jersey, 1962. 
Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica. In Katz, Nochlin, and Stover (eds) Writers 
on Ethics. D. Van Nostrand, Princeton, New Jersey, 1962. 
Samuelson, Pamela. "Digital Media and the Law." Con~n~zcnicatioirs of the ACM 34, no. 
10 (October 1991). 
Samuelson, Pamela. "Legally Speaking: First Amendment Rights for Information 
Providers?" Conmttcnicatioia of the ACM 31, no. 6 (June 1991). 
Samuelson, Pamela. "Legally Speaking: Liability for Defective Electronic Information. " 
Contnttcnications of the ACM 36, no. 1 (January 1993). 
Software Publishing Association, Software Piracy White Paper, Washington D.C., 1993. 
Stahl, Stephanie, "Dangerous E-Mail," Informationweek, September 12, 1994. 
Sterling, Bruce. IT;he Hacker Crackdou~it: h t  a id  Disorder on the Computer Frontier. 
New York: Bantam Books, 1992. 
Straub, Detmar W. Jr., and Rosann Webb Collins. "Key Information Liability Issues 
Facing Managers: Software Piracy, Proprietary Databases, and Individual Rights to 
Privacy." MIS Qtrarterly 14, no. 2 (June 1990). 
Taylor, C. Sources of the Self Cambridge, Ma., Harvard University Press,. 1989. 
Traver, Carol. The Privacy Debates: Review of the Law Literature 1970-1990. Working 
Paper, Human Genome Project, Center for the Study of Social Issues, Hackensack, New 
Jersey, 1994. 
United States Center for Education Statistics, Digest of Educational Statistics, 1990. 
United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare. Records, Computers and the 
Rights of Citizens. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1973. 
U.S. General Accounting Ofice, "Computer Security: DEB is Not Adequately Protecting 
National Security Information," GAO IMTEC 92-3 1, February 1992. 
Westin, Alan F. , Privacy and Freedom, New York, Athenum, 1967. 
30 Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stern School of Business 
Working Paper IS-94-09 
White, T., "Law and Ethics--Law and Medicine," in Fletcher, J. Introduction to Clinical 
Ethics and Health Care, New York, Macmillan, 1990. 
Wolinsky, Carol, and James Sylvester. "Privacy in the Telecommunications Age." 
Commtitrications of the ACM 35, no. 2 (February 1992). 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stern School of Business 
Working Paper IS-94-09 
